What is Legal Infancy?
When discussing legal matters, one may come across the phrase "infancy" and wonder what exactly this means. Infancy in a general sense refers to the state of a person’s life before the completion of the specified legal term to be considered an adult. In a legal context though, infancy as a term more specifically denotes that a person has not reached the age of majority, which is the age at which they are considered an adult under the law. The specifics of what this age of majority is varies by country, but in the United States, it is 18 years of age.
The states define the right of a person to enter into an agreement or sign other binding legal documents as the right of majority. The right of majority is given to persons of legal age and will then create legally enforceable obligations between parties. But the law does not hold the contracts of minors as being enforceable contracts. Infancy is, therefore, the legal term for referring to minors and encompasses all persons who are not of legal age.
Outside of the context of minors though, generally speaking , the use of "infancy" in law commonly refers to a person who is incapable of caring for themselves due to some sort of mental impairment or insanity. In this regard, the use of the word has evolved to have more than one meaning.
Within the context of contract law, a minor may modify a contract or dodge a contract binding them even if the contract was signed when the minor was underage and not legally able to enter into an agreement. Even if the other party has upheld their end of the contract, the minor may still avoid any legal obligations included in the contract. As a result, the party may take recourse against the minor in an attempt to recover the costs of the contract and any resulting damage that might have occurred due to a breach of contract. In such a situation, the court may hold the party liable for damages.
Minors still do hold the right of majority even if a parent or guardian has signed the right of majority on their behalf in a contract. The court does require a parent or guardian to hold the responsibility of fulfilling the obligations in the contract. The court may further hold any damages of the parent or guardian if the other party to the contract would be entitled to damages.
History Behind Infancy As a Defense
The earliest known reference to the infancy defense appears in the writings of the Roman lawyer, Gaius, around 160 AD. Basing his arguments on the Twelve Tables of Roman law, Gaius stated that a contract secured from an infant is voidable at the infant’s discretion. The Twelve Tables, however, did not strictly define what constitutes an infant. Donald W. McFormy stated in his 1985 work, "Gaius," that an infant was, quote/unquote, "he who has not reached his fourteenth year." The infancy defense developed during the Middle Ages within legal theorists of the time.
During the Middle Ages, the spread of Christianity brought a transformation in philosophical thought. Medieval scholastics like Saint Augustine and Thomas Aquinas viewed natural law as being the basic contractual principle. These religious philosophers viewed all contracts by which a party bound itself without any restriction as invalid, in the theory of coercive duress. They found that God’s intention for creation rests solely upon the voluntary acceptance of God’s grace by man. Hence, if a man were to freely choose to perish in Hell, he must be allowed the freedom to enter into that damnable pact.
Similarly, the concept of divine grace extends to the infancy defense. As stated by Justinian in his codification of Roman law, "that pact is deemed unconcluded which the contracting parties conclude in their own interest, but not on their own part." As a result, this notion was adopted into English common law. Medieval scholars asserted that a man’s age manifests in his natural law capacity to enter into contract. Consistent with Roman origin, English common law defined an infant as someone beneath 14 years of age. Under common law, an infant’s contract is voidable at his option, barring a few exceptions. In the United States, where common law is the principal source of law, the courts have generally included most minors (people under 18) as eligible for the infancy defense.
Infancy Defense in Criminal Cases
As a defense in criminal cases, the doctrine of infancy is most commonly used in just three states: New York, North Carolina, and South Carolina. In all three states, the purpose of the statute establishing the defense was to provide juveniles with alternatives to the formal adjudication of charges. It represents the legislatures’ determination that there may be different societal consequences, with regard to whether a child becomes involved in the juvenile justice system or is formally charged with a delinquent act and subject to the adult criminal justice system. In New York, the Family Court Act was created to address cases where a defendant has a defense to homicide due to his infancy. The statute provides that where a defendant is charged with homicide and claims infancy as a defense, the presumption is that he committed the homicide, but that he was legally too young to be criminally responsible. The burden is thus on the defendant to establish his infancy. In contrast, when a defendant denies the commission of the crime, the burden is on the prosecution to prove commission beyond a reasonable doubt to convict. Here, a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was less than 16 years old at the time of the offense and that he had, or lacked, the requisite criminal intent for the crime charged. The trial court bears the ultimate responsibility to determine whether the defendant has established a defense by a preponderance of the evidence. In establishing a defense, the defendant is not confined to his own testimony, but may produce expert testimony or other evidence to show an absence of criminal capacity.
The process begins with a transfer hearing; if the defendant succeeds in establishing the defense, the case is transferred to Family Court, which will treat the facts as if they had been presented at a family court adjudication hearing. The defendant must be prepared to proceed immediately to trial or the disposition of his care. If he fails in his defense, the court will decide if it is in the best interest of the child to transfer the matter to the Family Court for a dispositional hearing or whether the matter should proceed to trial in the Supreme Court. Using a similar concept, North Carolina established an age exemption in 1977 to provide juvenile pretrial diversion, but also used it as a public safety mechanism. Infancy simply creates a presumption that anyone under the age of 18 cannot be adjudicated as a delinquent if he is charged with the commission of a crime that would be a misdemeanor or felony if committed by an adult. Those charges remain in the juvenile court system, unless a petition for transfer is filed by the district attorney. The presumption can be overcome only if the district attorney can show that juvenile court has failed to rehabilitate the juvenile in the past. However, transfers are not allowed where the alleged act involves serious felonies such as a Class A felony or a Class B violent felony resulting in serious bodily injury to another person. Additionally, no transfers will be permitted against those persons who have an "emphatically" rehabilitated history with the juvenile justice system. In contrast, youth under the age of 7 are not criminally responsible because at that age there is not the requisite capacity to form criminal intent. Because this does not generally apply to any juvenile beyond 7, the presumption of no transfer for those charged with felonies where the defendant lacks conduct reflecting a "distorted moral sense" may provide some public safety protections for serious offenses. As to those cases, while the transfer is not automatic, the burden of proof is still on the state; it must show that the matter should be transferred to district court. Finally, South Carolina Code of Laws § 63-19-20 provides through its Childrens’ Code for youthful offenders, but does not apply to those charged with felonies or those children who have previously been tried as adults.
Infancy as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility
The legal concept of infancy is also relevant to the doctrine of parens patriae, particularly in terms of the age of criminal responsibility within a specific jurisdiction. The parens patriae doctrine gives the state a vested interest in whether a juvenile is charged with committing a criminal offense. In Virginia, for example, the age of criminal responsibility (defined as the minimum age at which a person can be charged with a criminal offense) is seven years old. See § 16.1-242 of the Code of Virginia. From the legislative history of this provision, it appears that the Legislature felt that a child younger than seven (7) would likely not have the requisite state of mind (mens rea) to commit a crime . The law also specifically states that a court cannot "commit a child to the Department of Juvenile Justice for an offense committed prior to his seventh birthday." See § 16.1-277.2 of the Code of Virginia. As a matter of public policy, therefore, a child cannot be incarcerated in a juvenile facility because he or she is too young to commit a crime in Virginia. The parens patriae doctrine here allows the state to protect the child from adult incarceration. Virginia’s statutory framework provides the attorney with important insight as to what behavioral age range the state thinks has amply developed to hold criminally responsible.
Cases for an Infancy Defense
In the 1976 case of Grillo v. Shapiro, the defendant attempted to invoke the infancy defense in a motor vehicle accident claim. The plaintiff was 19 at the time of the accident and had been stopped at a red light when he was rear-ended by the defendant’s vehicle that was traveling at highway speed. Plaintiff sustained neck and shoulder injuries as well as injuries to his jaw which required dental implant surgery. Defendant’s attorney claimed that the plaintiff was approximately 5’9" and weighed 140 lbs and that he was not fit to serve in the military with those physical characteristics. In correctly interpreting the law, the court held that since the plaintiff was 17 years of age at the time of the accident, and 19 at the time of the trial, he could not invoke the infancy defense because he was already a "person of full age." The court figured that the maturity level of a 19 year old would have been sufficient to be at the wheel of a vehicle. A few years later, in the case of Atso v. Farrell, the defendant had invoked the infancy defense in regard to his insurance carrier. The court in this case interpreted the municipal law that the "majority may be attained even before the actuall attainment of 18 years of age…". It was determined that rather than the insured having full disability coverage had he limited his municipal liability coverage, the defendant was held responsible to the full extent of his liability. The case of Comecino v. Pleasantville Union Free School District is an interesting case regarding the school judiciary privilege for nationwide school districts. The school jurisdictional boundaries are presented in the statute and prevent a minor from sustaining a cause of action against the school district without parental consent. Since the injured plaintiff in this case was only 11 years old, the parents of the plaintiff had not consented to the litigation against the school district. As a result, the suit was dismissed. In the case of Riccortelli v. Riccortelli, the defendant also invoked the infancy defense. The court determined that the plaintiff was disabled due to mental ignorance so he was unfit to establish a cause of action and could therefore not protect himself from liability. This case is somewhat self-contradictory in that the plaintiff was not only injured but cases of this sort are present a conflict of interests regarding an infant who is injured.
Objections and Criticisms to Infancy Defense
The infancy defense is not without its challenges and criticisms. For decades, there have been discussions among legal scholars about the validity and applicability of the standard when dealing with a case of presumed capacity. One criticism is that the standard of "too young to form the intent" in order to invoke the infancy defense is almost laughable. The most common presumption used to refute the standard of incapacity is doli incapax – the common law presumption that a child under 7 is incapable of committing a crime, unless the prosecution can prove otherwise (which is difficult, to say the least).
Some legal scholars argue that in the 17th and 18th centuries, ages 7 to 14 were generally those in which children were thought to reach puberty and have some sort of moral judgment. Generally, items such as parish records show that children were considered adults after they had reached this age. A rebuttable presumption of incapacity, however, is set only for these ages and caps its maximum age of 21. Legal scholars and practitioners have been attempting to reconcile the principles of the common law with those of contemporary society, as there are many who have different ideas about what constitutes the capacity to commit a crime.
Critics have focused on the differences behind the concepts of mens rea (a "guilty mind") and actus reus (a "guilty act"). Although there is a rebuttable presumption of incapacity for those under the age of 14 in many states, there are other crimes, such as sexual crimes, that are only able to be committed by those who have reached adulthood. Critics generally state that the age of consent to commit a crime should be consistent – the minimum capacity to commit a crime should not change based on the type of crime. Alternate forms of statutory interpretation have been proposed , such as a flat exclusion of children under the age of 7 from prosecution for any crime, a bright-line rule that would eliminate the rebuttable presumption entirely or an extension of the rebuttable presumption up to the age of 16.
Although attempts have been made to alter statutory interpretation, legislative processes continue to approve of the continuity of the common law history. For example, the Federal Sentencing Commission is reviewing the mandates under the current law and considering the addition of new provisions that would address the treatment of youth in the criminal justice system. The United States Sentencing Commission recently received public testimony about the treatment of youth in the criminal system and published a 186-page report entitled "Youthful Offenders in Federal Criminal Court." Other noted sources for scholarly criminology research have published books that propose alternative means for the treatment of youth in the criminal justice system on a federal level. More importantly, 48 states have passed revisions to their sentencing and commitment statutes that reflect a desire to consider a variety of factors in sentencing youth and reward them for rehabilitation and positive behavior while incarcerated. In addition, 32 states and the District of Columbia have issued instructions to the courts to consider youth and immaturity at the time of the offense.
The issue of "melting away" infants continues to be a topic of discussion among legal scholars and practitioners. The requirements for invoking the defenses are so stringent that even where the defense has been successful in the past, it is nearly impossible to use today.